INTRODUCTION
Locality of the article: The article titled, Utrum creation operi naturae admisceatur, is elaborated in the De Potentia III, 8. References to this are noted in the Summa Theologia I, 14, 8; I, 45, 8; I, 79, 2-5; De Anima III, 5, 10, Commentary on Metaphysics, 6, 7, 8. De Principiis Naturae I. The reason behind the problem as contained in the Article: In this part, Aquinas confronts the issue of creation from nature, that is to say, generation. He confronts this issue, based on his conviction of the inherent misunderstanding or ignorance as to the nature of Matter and Form. He outlines particular individuals whose misconception of the term Matter and Form, have created a plethora of erroneous doctrines concerning generation. They include Anaxagoras, Plato and Avicenna. Anaxagoras, owing to the cosmological belief of his day notes that that which is created must have already been in actual existence. This thought of Anaxagoras was prevalent amongst the Eleatics. This according to Aquinas, led to the belief that nothing is made except in the sense that it is drawn out of another, wherein it was latent. Parmenides argued ruling out coming to be and passing away. The implication of this being that “what is”, for Parmenides is without start or stop. According to Anaxagoras, things do not come and pass away, but are mixed together and disassociated from the things that are.1 In the same line of thought as Empedocles, Anaxagoras accepted the impossibility that one thing changes into another, which was advocated by the Eleatic philosophy and yet Anaxagoras attempted to explain the empirical phenomena of change by mixture and separation of the universe. Anaxagoras maintained that there was neither creation, generation, nor corruption of nature, but from the beginning, everything had been in everything. Namely his famous doctrine is, Everything is in everything. In Anaxagoras, there is neither potential nor actual pre-existence, there is only actual existence, for “if it pre-existed potentially it would become out of nothing, while if it pre-existed actually, it would not become at all, since what is, does not become”.2 Anaxagoras considered the universe to always have existed, but existed in its initial form as chaos. Order was brought into the universe by the Nous. The Nous, did not create anything, but only arranged all that was chaotic in the universe. Thus accounting for what Aquinas notes as “drawn out of another wherein it was latent”3 . This line of thought is adopted by Plato, but in a different mode, to this Aquinas considers an error in understanding the nature of Form. Plato ascribed the creation of the material world to the divine craftsman (the Deimurge). The word “demiurge” is a derivative of the Greek δημιουργός, dēmiourgos, meaning literally “public worker”. It was originally a common noun meaning “craftsman” or “artisan”, but gradually it came to mean “producer” and eventually “creator”. The philosophical usage and the proper noun derive from Plato’s Timaeus, written around 360 BC, in which the demiurge is presented as the creator of the universe. This is accordingly the definition of the demiurge in the Platonic (ca. 310 BC-90 BC) and Middle Platonic (ca. 90 BC-300 AD) philosophical traditions. In the various branches of the Neoplatonic school (third century onwards), the demiurge is the fashioner of the real, perceptible world, and of the Ideas, but (in most neoplatonic systems) is still not itself “the One”. The Deimurge never created any form, but only applied the forms to the material world. As seen in his theory of the divided line, that which stands as prior to the forms is the One, which is itself uncreated. From such analysis it hold firm that the Deimurge itself is a created agent, whose agency is seen in the attribution of the forms to matter (This sort of replicates the Nous doctrine Anaxagoras). A further argument is spelt out by Avicenna (Ibn-Sina). His argument arises from his conception of creation. For Ibn Sina, the first emanation from necessary Being is numerically one; it is the first intelligence. Viewed from one aspect its existence is possible in itself and from another, it is necessary through the First Being; it knows its own essence as well as the essence of the First Being. It is the spring of multiplicity, for it has three kinds of knowledge: of the First Being- God, of its own essence insofar as it is necessary (viewed from God), and of its being as possible. Thus from the first intelligence emanate three beings: the second intelligence, the first soul and the first sphere of the fixed stars. The second intelligence viewed from itself it is possible, but from the first emanation it is necessary. From it emanates another intelligence, a second heavenly sphere and its soul. The second emanation thinks of the first being, of itself as a possible being and as a necessary being viewed from the first emanation. These continue until the last or the tenth intelligence appears and with it the ninth emanations. This tenth intelligence is also called the active intelligence, which is in the lowest sphere acts in our world. It produces the first matter which is passive and formless, but which is the basis of the four elements from which all creatures are made. The tenth intelligence, as it is the producer of matter, is the dispenser of forms. It gives to each matter its proper form and it also gives each body a soul, which as a matter of fact is its form, when that body is ready to receive it. Thus the last intelligence is the cause of the existence of the human soul as well.4 An implication of this, as will be noted by Aquinas, is the belief that every human person shares one active intellect. What stands as the difference between the point made by Anaxagoras-inclined thinkers and that of Plato is that, while for the former, the composite (form and matter) substance has existed chaotically from the beginning. The Nous only comes in to create order. The latter notes that the form exists separate from the matter, and it is the divine craftsman that occasions the sensible world by taking from the Forms and merging them with Matter.
CONCEPT CLARIFICATION In this passage of the De Potentia, a major concept that needs to be clarified is generation, from this clarity its distinction from creation will also be indicated. An understanding of what generation is: According to Aquinas, in direct corroboration to the thought of Aristotle, “every process of generation is from matter”5 . Using the example of an artisan, we notice that in the making of a brazen sphere, he makes this from bronze, which is matter. Matter here is understood as the composite, for matter as a substance cannot exist without a particular form that determines it. Thus the artisan generates the brazen sphere, a new substance, from an already existing substance. The artisan produces the form accidentally and not substantially. Aquinas explains this point making reference again to the artisan, he notes that …it ought to be evident that, just as an agent does not produce the matter or subject of generation, for example, the bronze, when he generates something, so too “neither does he produce the form,” namely, the thing itself which is a sphere, except perhaps accidentally; for he makes a brazen sphere, which is a composite. And since a brazen sphere is also a sphere, he therefore accidentally produces a sphere.6 That is to say that in generation, neither the matter nor the form of that from which generation is occasioned, is made. What is generated is the composite, because “since generation pertains to the thing generated, it is evident that it is not the form that is generated but the composite”7 . Aquinas is clear on this point as he notes: Here he(Aristotle) shows that it is composite things which are generated. He says that an agent does make a sphere to be; for he makes it from bronze, which is the matter, as the principle of generation, and from sphere, which is the form and terminus of generation. For he causes “this form,” i.e., the figure of a sphere, “in this,” i.e., in the matter, in the sense that he changes this bronze into a sphere, and this is a brazen sphere, or the form of a sphere in bronze.8 Thus of things generated, we can identify 3 classes:
a. That by which something comes from: Agent, that is “that everything which comes to be, comes to be by something, and this is the agent or generator, which is the principle of generation”9 .
b. That from which something comes from: Matter, that is “everything which comes to be, comes to be from something, and by this something from which generation takes place we mean the matter and not the privation”10.
c. That which comes to be: Something (the substance), that is “every process of generation there must be something which comes to be”11. We see from the above that the focus regards generation viewed as an action to a particular nature, from without, in which the principle of motion is extrinsic to it (the principle could also be intrinsic). This is somewhat referred to as the reason for the cause of generation. Aquinas notes that The reason for… the cause of generation is either a proper cause or an accidental one. For if it is a proper cause, it is either the principle of motion intrinsic to a thing, and then it is nature, or it is extrinsic to the thing, and then it is art; for nature is a principle of motion in that in which it exists, but art does not exist in the thing produced by art but in something else.12 The reason is either extrinsic or intrinsic. He notes further: And the reason for this… is that in every generation something which was formerly potential becomes actual. Now a thing can be said to go from potency to actuality only by reason of some actual being, which is the agent by which the process of generation is brought about. Now potency pertains to. The matter from which something is generated: and actuality pertains to the thing generated.13 At this point, the marks of a profound understanding of what generation is, stands in the offing, this is because as much as the extrinsic reason of the cause of generation is implied, there is also the intrinsic. To understand at this point, we need to define generation. Generation according to Aquinas is motion to form.14 There are two kinds of generation namely:
a. Formae Substantiali Generatio Simpliciter, for instance, man begetting man
b. Formae Accidentali Generatio Secundum Quid, for instance man becoming white.15 From the above definition, what is drawn forth is that generation is “motion”. Recalling what has been stated above, we can thus assert that in Aquinas, the intrinsic reason for the cause of generation, refers to generation by nature, and not by art. Generation by nature is such that the principle of motion resides intrinsically in the thing. Thus proceeding with the nexus seemingly created by Aquinas, in which motion is indicated to be involved in generation, a brief exposé on what motion is will be required. What is motion? Aquinas defines motion as “motion is neither the potency of a thing existing in potency, nor the act of a thing in act, but it is the act of a thing in potency; where the word “act” designates its relation to a prior potency, and the words “of a thing in potency” designates its relation to a further act”16. That which is potentially moved, is not said to have motion. That which has been actually moved is linked with the term motion, in the sense that it has been moved, but that which is in the process of going from potency to act, is principally what is associated with the concept of the act of motion. What is in potency only is not yet being moved; what is already in perfect act is not being moved but has already been moved. Consequently, that is being moved which is midway between pure potency and act, which is partly in potency and partly in act.17 That being said, it is evident that for any motion whatsoever to occur, two principles must play a part, namely potency and act. This is applicable to generation. From these two principles involved in motion, three requirements are derived for the occasioning of generation, namely
a. Being in potency (matter)
b. Non-existence in act (Privation)
c. That through which something comes to be in act (form).18
These three requirements are better understood as three principles of nature. Of the three, Matter and Form are per se principles of nature, this is because in generation, these two principles remain, but privation is lost. The principle of privation is a per accidens principle, for it is one with matter. This implies that privation is transient, for matter that does not have privation is permanent matter. Privation is the principle of becoming and not existing, but the other two are both principles of becoming and existing. It is not a negation, because the latter does not determine a subject.19 Of these two per se principles, which double also as causes in nature, there are two other causes added, the efficient and the final. These latter two are extrinsic, while the first two are intrinsic. From all that has been thus gathered, it is obvious that what is generated moves from potency to act, what is generated needs an underlying subject, which is a composite, and what is generated is a composite. Separating generation from creation: According to Aquinas, creation is neither creature nor creator. It stands at the middle, indicating a relationship between both. It is a real relationship from the point of view of the creature to the Creator, but a relationship of reason from the point of view of the Creator to the created. In the first case, the creature depends on the Creator, but in the second case, there is no dependence of the Creator on the created, but a reference that is seen via the lens of the human reason, what we refer to as a respectus. Creation is production but not in the same vein as generation or mutation. This is because while the latter requires matter, that is to say a subject, for its exercise, creation does not stand in need of a subject, but is a single act that is properly referred to God. For both generation and creation, there is a genus of relation, understood via the lens of movement. As regards motion, Aquinas in the De Potentia III, 3, notes that there is a difference between the term of movement and the process of movement. He notes that both “…differ from each other, while the movement is in progress, and when the term has been reached”20. This is because “While the movement is in progress, the thing moved is receding from one term and approaching the other: which does not apply when the term has been reached…”.21 The term of movement is also referred to as the act of motion. Motion is an act, as noted by Aquinas, "That by which something previously existing in potency becomes actual is an act. But something becomes actual when it is being moved, although previously it was in potency. Therefore motion is an act.”22 Yet motion is also in the process, for “…before something is being moved it is in potency to two acts: to a perfect act which is the term of the motion and to an imperfect act which is motion itself”23. In sum, the term of movement refers to the act of motion that has been attained to, as when boiled water becomes hot. While the process of movement expresses the passage of time as the object recedes from a potency and approaches an act, as when water is being heated, in which case we say that it has some measure of heat. In generation, the motion process (that to an imperfect act) and the motion term (that to the perfect act) acts on a subject, but creation, “cannot be taken for a movement of the creature previous to its reaching the term of movement, but denotes the accomplished fact”.24 Creation thus, does not signify a movement to being, as exemplified in the agent and the patient; nor does it denote a change effected by the Creator. But it is merely a beginning of existence, and a relation to the Creator from whom the creature receives its being. Consequently, creation is really nothing but a relation of the creature to the Creator together with a beginning of existence. 25 While motion is properly an element of generation, this is not proper to creation.
CRITICAL ARGUMENT(S) Reference needs to be made to the title of the article, which is “Does God work in Nature by creating?” Which when asked differently can be, “is the work of creation still on-going constantly in nature?” Since God alone has the exclusive right of creation, does it mean that he is constantly creating in nature? Or does nature create? Quickly Aquinas points out the error in such thinking, an error that lies in making generation a realistic synonym of creation. This error is heightened further by a misconception of the nature of Matter and that of Form. Thus there is the need to understand Matter and Form, with respect to generation; but even in such attempt, an understanding of these concepts of Matter and Form with the act of generation might pave the way for further misconstrued opinions. This is because in the process of generation, that which is generated is the composite, which is neither matter alone, nor form alone. Even though the form is “is that by reason of which generation takes place”26, what is generated is the composite. Aquinas notes that the “composite has the nature [ratio] of ‘being from a principle’”.27 However, the form in its operation is that which determines albeit actualizes matter, for the “form is nature more than matter”28. As that which actualizes matter, the form is naturally prior to matter, “for a thing is said to be greater insofar as it is in act rather than insofar as it is in potency”29. That which reduces potency to act, must already be in act, “Whence form, according to which a thing is natural in act, is nature more than matter, according to which a thing is something natural in potency”30. In the De Principiis Naturae, Aquinas notes that even though the form in its operation of actualization of matter, stands naturally prior to matter, in substance and completeness, Matter, stands prior to form when viewed according to generation and time.31 This is logical because before any act, there is an initial potency. We have established that it is the form that actualizes matter, standing naturally to matter in substance and completeness. This pertains to nature which arises from generation, and this is the form. Aquinas notes: He says that although a bed does not come to be from a bed, as Antiphon said, man does come to be from man. Whence what they say is true, namely, that the form of bed is not the nature, but the wood is. For if wood should germinate, a bed would not come to be, but wood. Therefore, as this form, which does not arise through germination, is not nature but art, so the form which arises from generation is nature. But the form of a natural thing does arise through generation, for man comes to be from man. Therefore the form of a natural thing is nature.32 He further notes that: For the process of generation can be said to be a result either of the form or of a part of the form, or of something having the form or a part of the form; but it comes from something having the form as from a generator, and from the form or a part of the form as from something by which the generator generates; for it is not the form that generates or acts, but the thing having the form generates and acts by means of it.33
As we try to understand this that which should not be oblivious to us, is the fact that in generation, it is not the nature that is generated, but it is the composite bearing the nature that is generated. The form only subsists in the composite generated. That is to say that the form is of the composite rather than saying that the form is the composite. To recap the nature of what is generated is the form, but what is generated is the composite. This implies that the composite generated is always accompanied by it consequent nature, which is the form. How is this nature generated? According to Aquinas, everything has the natural tendency to produce its like. That which is generated is either generated properly or accidentally. In whatever is generated by something accidentally, the generator does not have to be likened to the thing generated; for example, the discovery of a treasure has no likeness in him who, when he digs in order to plant something, discovers the treasure accidentally. But a generator in the proper sense generates something of the same kind as itself. Hence in a proper generator the likeness of the thing generated must exist in some way.34 To the proper generator aspect of generation, this comes about in three ways:
a. Univocally, eg, man begets man, horse begets horse; when the form of the thing generated pre-exists in the generator according to the same mode of being, and in a similar matter.
b. Partly univocally and partly equivocally, eg house as preexisting as a form in the subject (equivocally) and having its own form (univocally); when the form of the thing generated pre-exists in the generator, neither according to the same mode of being, nor in a substance of the same kind.
c. Non-univocally, eg the medicine which has been heated there pre-exists the heat which is a part of health; when the whole form of the thing generated does not preexist in the generator, but only some part of it or a part of a part.35 In generation, there is a pre-existence of the nature generated in the generator, who is the agent, for “a thing is generated by something like itself”36. Then how is the Form of the generator one with the generated? Aquinas notes that this can be realized
a. Totally: as the form of a house is in the mind of the master builder, and the form of the fire which is generated is in the fire which generates it.
b. Partly: as when a hot medicine restores health by heating; for the heat produced in the one who is being healed is a part of health.
c. Virtually (in virtue of) but partly: as when motion restores health by heating; for heat is present in the motion virtually but not actually.
d. Totally virtually (in virtue of): as when the form of numbness is in the eel which makes the hand numb.37
In what has been outlined above, a point to recall is that between the three ways in which generation occurs and the four ways in which the form of the generator is found in the generated, both the natural and artificial aspects of generation are included. Types of Generation: According to Aquinas, generation can be natural or artificial. In the aspect of the artificial generation, it can either be by art or by chance. Nonetheless, whether the generation seem to happen naturally or artificially, in proper generation, the form of that which is generated pre-exists in the generator. Considering the generation of a house by a builder, that which is built pre-exists in him, not in the materials of building. To capture this Aquinas notes: …those things which are constituted by nature are similar to those which come to be by art; for the seed acts for the purpose of generating, and this is what happens in the case of things which come to be by art; for just as a master builder is not a house actually and does not possess the form which constitutes a house actually but only potentially, so too the seed is not an animal actually, nor does it possess a soul actually, which is the form of an animal, but only potentially. For in the seed there is a formative power which is related to the matter of the thing conceived in the same way in which the form of the house in the mind of the builder is related to the stones and timbers; but there is this difference: the form of an art is wholly extrinsic to the stones and timbers, whereas the power of the seed is present in the seed itself.38 On the artificial generation, arising from chance, the occurrence of those things that arise from decay are proposed. To explain how the form is generated in these things, Aquinas makes use of the totally virtual form of generator to generated. He states that …in the matter of those things which are generated from decay there also exists a principle which is similar to the active power in the seed, by which the soul of such animals is caused. And just as the power in the seed comes from the complete soul of the animal and from the power of a celestial body, in a similar fashion the power of generating an animal which exists in decayed matter is from a celestial body alone, in which all forms of things which are generated are present virtually as in their active principle.39 In response to Ibn-Sina: the fact of Ibn-Sina’s misconception of generation with creation, which Aquinas states as follows, “Avicenna held this to be the lowest intelligence among separate substances”40, leads to the mistake of ascribing one active intelligence to all existents. He elaborated further that the agent intellect was the last in the series of incorporeal intelligences, a spiritual substance that ruled the sublunar world and illuminated the human intellect by intelligible forms. Avicenna’s view was also that the agent intellect was an entity separated from the human soul. For Avicenna the agent intellect was the active intellect of mankind, the source of abstract concepts and first principles of thought, which are received by the intellect, which is the part of human soul. This necessitated the mistake of considering the soul not as a single unit with an active and passive power whose operation are in silk-flowing sync that a difference is hardly ever noticed, but as a unit with only a passive power, gifted with an active power at the production of a new thing. The passive was individuated in every single human person, but the agent intellect was the same. This further means that at production of a substantial thing, there was the infusion of the agent intellect on that which was produced, which is tantamount to a creative work. A better understanding of the agent and potential intellect: According to Aquinas, I say with Avicenna… that the possible intellect indeed begins to exist with the body, but it does not cease with the body, and it is diverse in diverse men, and is multiplied according to the division of matter in diverse individuals, just like other substantial forms; I further add that the agent intellect is diverse in diverse men, for it does not seem probable that the rational soul lacks the principle whereby it can bring about its natural operation, but that is what would follow if one agent intellect is posited, whether it is called God or an intelligence.41 According to Aquinas there are four qualities of that are found in the human soul’s power of agent intellection, first, its separation from matter; second, its impassibility; third, its purity, by which he means that it is neither made up of bodily natures nor conjoined with a bodily organ.42 These qualities of the agent intellect are also possessed by the potential intellect. But the fourth is in where the difference is found, namely the agent intellect is essentially always in act, while the potential intellect is essentially potential and comes to act only by receiving an intelligible object.43 The human soul’s intellectual power is potential. To explain this, Aquinas makes reference the fact of the human intellect’s stance with regards to universal being. He notes, The intellect… has an operation extending to universal being. We may therefore see whether the intellect be in act or potentiality by observing first of all the nature of the relation of the intellect to universal being. For we find an intellect whose relation to universal being is that of the act of all being: and such is the Divine intellect, which is the Essence of God, in which originally and virtually, all being pre-exists as in its first cause. And therefore the Divine intellect is not in potentiality, but is pure act. But no created intellect can be an act in relation to the whole universal being; otherwise it would needs be an infinite being. Wherefore every created intellect is not the act of all things intelligible, by reason of its very existence; but is compared to these intelligible things as a potentiality to act.44 He continues further …the human intellect, which is the lowest in the order of intelligence and most remote from the perfection of the Divine intellect, is in potentiality with regard to things intelligible, and is at first "like a clean tablet on which nothing is written," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4). This is made clear from the fact, that at first we are only in potentiality to understand, and afterwards we are made to understand actually. And so it is evident that with us to understand is "in a way to be passive"; taking passion in the third sense. And consequently the intellect is a passive power.45 Yet there is also need for the power of the agent intellect to be located in the same wise in the human soul as the potential intellect is. Aquinas notes I answer that, The truth about this question depends on what we have already said (Article 4). For if the active intellect were not something belonging to the soul, but were some separate substance, there would be one active intellect for all men. And this is what they mean who hold that there is one active intellect for all. But if the active intellect is something belonging to the soul, as one of its powers, we are bound to say that there are as many active intellects as there are souls, which are multiplied according to the number of men…46 On the situation of the agent intellect in the soul, with it being differentiated and individuated in each human person, Aquinas notes: I answer that, The active intellect, of which the Philosopher speaks, is something in the soul. In order to make this evident, we must observe that above the intellectual soul of man we must needs suppose a superior intellect, from which the soul acquires the power of understanding. For what is such by participation, and what is mobile, and what is imperfect always requires the pre-existence of something essentially such, immovable and perfect. Now the human soul is called intellectual by reason of a participation in intellectual power; a sign of which is that it is not wholly intellectual but only in part. Moreover it reaches to the understanding of truth by arguing, with a certain amount of reasoning and movement. Again it has an imperfect understanding; both because it does not understand everything, and because, in those things which it does understand, it passes from potentiality to act. Therefore there must needs be some higher intellect, by which the soul is helped to understand.47 The location of the agent intellect’s location in the human soul is based on the fresh understanding offered by Aristotle, who maintains that the intelligibility of things are, contrary to Plato, not located in a different world, but are contained in the sensible thing. Thus if the intelligible is to be found as such, thus for the intellect to grasp this, there would needs be the presence of an intellectual power that could derive this via a means of abstraction. We have earlier asserted that the intellect is passive to learning, that is to say that it does not know as the divine intellect, God, does, who knows as at once, but it undergoes a series of illuminatory phases before arriving at knowledge. Aquinas maintains that for the reduction from potentiality to act, there needs be the presence of an agent that is already in act. Thus just as the “senses as made actual by what is actually sensible… We must therefore assign on the part of the intellect some power to make things actually intelligible, by abstraction of the species from material conditions”.48 The coherent operation of these two operative intellective powers makes for a differentiation in the soul, that is to say two souls having two distinct powers, but Aquinas notes that
However, it should be understood that it is not absurd that there be two things such that each is in potency with respect to the other though not in the same sense; as fire is potentially cold, which water actually is, and water is potentially warm which fire actually is. So it is that they act and are acted upon by one another. I say that sensible things relate similarly to the intellective soul: for the sensible thing is potentially intelligible and actually has a distinct nature; in the soul there is the actual intellectual light; but the determinant of knowledge with respect to this or that nature is in potency; just as the pupil is in potency with respect to this or that colour. The soul has a power, namely agent intellect, through which it makes sensible species to be actually intelligible, and it has a power through which it is in potency such that it can be brought into the act of determinate knowledge by the species of the intelligible thing made intelligible in act; and this power is called the possible intellect.49 It is one soul, with the one intellect having two powers of intellection. In response to Plato, we have already stated that such absurdity of thought is falsified based on the fact of that the intelligible forms exists in the matter, and not in a different. This thus implies that there would not be the need of a divine craftsman to be called to action whenever a substance is about to be produced.
These responses outlined above gives emphasis to the fact of a negation to a continued work of creation in the dynamics of nature. In response to Anaxagoras: As earlier mentioned, Anaxagoras’ thought was the fruit of his time. Drawing from such big weights as Parmenides, Anaxagoras advances with the maxim that “everything is everything”. The Parmenidean thought system held that what is, is and what is not cannot be. In his poems on Nature he states: One path only is left for us to speak of, namely, that it is. In it are very many tokens that what is, is uncreated and indestructible, alone, complete, immovable and without end. Nor was it ever, nor will it be; for now it is, all at once, a continuous one. For what kind of origin for it, will you look for ? In what way and from what source could it have drawn its increase? I shall not let thee say nor think that it came from what is not; for it can neither be thought nor uttered that what is not is. And, if it came from nothing, what need could have made it arise later rather than sooner? Therefore must it either be altogether or be not at all. Nor will the force of truth suffer aught to arise besides itself from that which in any way is… how could it come into being? If it came into being, it is not; nor is it if it is going to be in the future.50 What is, then has always been and what is not remains as it is, nothing. The coming of being from nothing is referenced here as being absurdly impossible. Aquinas corrects this as he notes “It is not correct to say that the form is made in matter, rather should we say that it is educed from the potentiality of matter”.51 Can creation pertain to any other being apart from God? This question is partly raised arising from the misconception-riddled analyses of Plato and Avicenna. Aquinas in the De Potentia III, 1, notes, making reference to the De Causis, that “being (esse) is by creation…” In De Potentia III, 3, he notes that “creation is an accomplished fact”. In another place he notes, what is created, is not made by movement, or by change. For what is made by movement or by change is made from something pre-existing. And this happens, indeed, in the particular productions of some beings, but cannot happen in the production of all being by the universal cause of all beings, which is God. Hence God by creation produces things without movement. Now when movement is removed from action and passion, only relation remains…52 What is created, is being, and this is made from nothing, but what is generated is a type of being, and this is made from the privation of that being, for example, “the generation of a man is from the "notbeing" which is "not-man,"”53. In the act of creation, there is nothing which pre-exists in the thing that is created, this is the differential mark between creation and every other form of change, which presupposes some matter or subject.
How can this further be understood? In SCG II, 22, it says, “everything exists because it has esse.” In SCG II, 15, Aquinas notes that there is a proportionality of effects to causes, effects are commensurate to their causes. Thus just as effects are referred to their appropriate causes, thus that which is common to the effect must have a common cause. Esse is common to all that is. Everything participates in the esse that is the effect of the IES. The IES transcends all that is. The implication of this is that it cannot be the cause of a single existent, but is the cause of all that exists. Since there is a necessary proportionality of effect to cause, a universal cause must have a universal effect. A potential cause, produces a potential effect, an actual cause leads to an actual effect, a particular cause will produce a particular effect (ST, I, 45, 1). For the effect depends on the cause in as much as it participates in the cause (Expositio De Ebdomadibus, lect. 2, p. 271:80–83). Thus, the effect of the IES, must necessary be on a universal level. The first effect of the IES, is the esse (De Potentia III, 4). Thus, what emanates from the IES, as its first effect, is the Ipsum Esse, (and this is creation, that to say it is the level of creation), for the work of creation is in the absolute production of esse and not in the production of this or that esse. It is the esse that actuates completely the capacity of the essence and is the original fount of all the riches in the ens. This is valid for all enti. 54 The perfection of the esse has a virtuality and a force of expansion that is remarkably incomprehensible, because it pervades the entirety of all essences, while continuing “to be” as it always is the esse, or the ipsum esse or the actus essendi. Thus esse found in the enti, is realized either in more or less fashion, while conserving its proper identity. It is properly referred to as the “intensive act”.55 In corporeal substances, the essence is composed of matter and form,56 but in the SCG II, 54, 4, Aquinas notes that the form is the principle of the esse. This ought to be better explained. What is being referred to here as “the form is the principle of the esse”, can also be construed as forma dat esse. 57 This forma dat esse signifies two things which is: a. That the form gives to the composite the formale actuality b. That the form gives to the composite the l’atto di essere. 58 This implies that the l’esse ut actus is the principle in the transcendental order suited for the original constitution of the ens, and the form is the principle in the predicamental order for the determination of the grade of perfection59 in the ens. Thus the form is not the principle of the l’esse ut actus, but is the principle of the l’esse in actu, what Aquinas refers to as “having its own esse” (ST I, 45, 4). The form as the principle of esse means that (according to SCG II, 54, 6) the form can be called that by which a thing is. The form, however, is not the thing, for even though the form is “that by reason of which generation takes place (De Principiis Naturae, II), that which is generated is the composite. In the De Substantis Separatis, he notes that a composite being, considered in its essence, already has a form but it participates in the l’esse through its form. 60 He notes further that First Principle produces the first effect immediately and through the mediation of the first effect, He brings things into being in a certain order. By way of change and motion, certain effects can be brought into being by the First Principle through the mediation of second causes; but according to that mode of production which takes place without motion, called creation, an effect is reduced to God alone as its Author.61 The esse is the effect of the Ipsum Esse Subsistens, as earlier noted. In the SCG, Aquinas notes: Moreover, to act only by motion and change is incompatible with the universal cause of being; for, by motion and change a being is not made from absolute non-being, but this being from this non-being. Yet, as was shown, God is the universal principle of being. Therefore, to act only by motion or by change is contrary to His nature. Neither, then, is it proper to Him to need pre-existing matter in order to make something.62 The point emphasized here is that in generation, the principle of privation which is one and the same time conjoined to matter is active, but in Creation, this is absent. In Creation is there is the presence of nothing, total negation, a negation that is non-determining. Whereas in privation, there is determination, “for privation is not negation”63. Generation arises from non-existence, but creation arises from nothing.
RENOWNED OBJECTIONS The objections to this part of the De Potentia are twenty (20) in number, and the Aquinas gives short replies, based on the fact that the corpus of the work carries the full explanation of all that is being objected upon. Nonetheless there are three major objections that stand out, three objections that Aquinas does not fully elaborate in the De Potentia, but does so in his Commentary on the Metaphysics. The objections thus that would be considered includes objections 1, 15 and 16.
Objection 1: in this objection, the biblical quotation of 1Corinthians 3:6, neither suggests that the there is an ongoing work of creation in the order of nature not does it state that God has bestowed to the dynamics of nature, the act of creation. It emphasizes the point that has just been lately unveiled, which is that in the acts of nature, the work of creation is seen in the activity of generation. That is to say that the activity of generation was at one and the same time instilled at creation. According to Aquinas in ST I, 90, 4, God alone can create, for the first agent alone can act without presupposing the existence of anything, while the second cause always presupposes something derived from the first cause… everything acts by producing a change (that is generation), whereas God alone acts by creation. In the De Potentia III, 7, he states: God is his own power, and that he is in all things not as part of their essence, but as upholding them in their being, we shall conclude that he acts in every agent immediately without prejudice to the action of the will and of nature.64 Nature does act, having in itself the power of generation, a power that has been instilled upon it by the Creator at creation. God’s work in nature is immediate by the fact that God upholds all that is in nature in being, for “He gives everything the power to act, and preserves it in being…”65 Although nature generates, God is the cause of all that is generated. Aquinas lists out four arguments still in the De Potentia III, 7, which will be briefly stated here to majorly emphasize the notion that the instantaneous creative act of God (the creative work of God as an accomplished fact, De Potentia III, 3) is to be differentiated from the daily process of generation in nature. Further more, it will show how God’s instantaneous creative act (as an accomplished fact), has made possible the act of generation in nature, for God is the first cause of all that is. Briefly the four arguments are about how one thing causes another to act, they include:
a. God causes all the actions of nature, because he gave natural things the forces whereby they are able to act, not only as the generator gives power to heavy and light bodies yet does not preserve it, but also as upholding its very being, forasmuch as he is the cause of the power bestowed, not only like the generator in its becoming, but also in its being; and thus God may be said to be the cause of an action by both causing and upholding the natural power in its being.
b. God preserves and sustains the power of action in nature, as it upholds it in being.
c. God causes the act of nature by moving it to act.
d. One thing causes the action of another, as a principal agent causes the action of its instrument: and in this way again, God causes every action of natural things.66
Objection 15: this concerns the generation of animals from decay or from putrid matter and not from seed as seen in the natural generation. We had earlier affirmed that Aquinas considers generation to be either natural or artificial, and in the artificial aspect, it is either by art or by chance. The generation of animals from putrid matter, does not give credence to the belief in the ongoing work of creation, but indicates the intended action of a proper agent or an accidental act. In his Commentary on the Metaphysics, he states: …animals which are generated without seed from decay do not seem to be produced by chance but by some definite agent, namely, by the power of the heavens, which supplies in the generation of such animals the energy of the generative power found in the seed.67 He goes on to assert: …it must be noted that nothing prevents a process of generation from being a proper process when referred to one cause, and yet be an accidental or chance affair when referred to another cause, as is evident in the Philosopher’s example. For when health results from a vigorous rubbing quite apart from the aim of the one doing the rubbing, the process of restoring health, if it is referred to nature, which governs the body, is not accidentally but properly aimed at. However, if it is referred to the aim of the one doing the rubbing, it will be accidental and a matter of chance. Similarly, if the process of generation of an animal generated from decay is referred to the particular causes acting here below, it will also be found to be accidental and a matter of chance; for heat, which causes decay, is not inclined by nature to have as its goal the generation of this or that particular animal which results from decay, as the power in the seed has as its goal the generation of something of a particular type. But if it is referred to the power of the heavens, which is the universal power regulating generation and corruption in these lower bodies, it is not accidental but is directly aimed at, because its goal is that all forms existing potentially in matter should be brought to actuality. Thus Aristotle has correctly compared here the things which come to be by art with those which come to be by nature. 68 The same biological processes that act on the seed, in the natural generation (by virtue of the act of the power of the heavens), also acts as the proper agent of those animals that are generated from decay, when considered from the part of the agent. But when considered from the part of those generated, then the act is accidentally wrought by chance. However, the same powers that are at work when life is generated from seed, is also at work when life is generated without seed, but from decaying matter.
Objection 16: Aquinas subscribes to the fact that nature has the tendency to produce its like, that is to say that a man cannot beget a dog, and a dog cannot beget a cat. But the rigidity of this ethos of nature is circumvented in the case of horses and mules. If this objection holds, then it might be that nature does create. But Aquinas responds to this by calling upon the term, “Proximate Genus”. He states, He shows that separate Forms cannot be the cause of the generation of things after the manner of an exemplar. He says that even though in some cases one may encounter the problem whether the generator is similar to the thing generated, still in the case of some things it is evident that the generator is of the same kind as the thing generated: not numerically the same but specifically, as is clear in the case of natural beings; for man begets man, and similarly a horse begets a horse, and each natural thing produces something similar to itself in species, unless something beyond nature happens to result, as when a horse begets a mule. And this generation is beyond nature, because it is outside of the aim of a particular nature. 69 He continues: …the formative power, which is in the sperm of the male, is designed by nature to produce something completely the same as that from which the sperm has been separated; but its secondary aim, when it cannot induce a perfect likeness, is to induce any kind of likeness that it can. And since in the generation of a mule the sperm of a horse cannot induce the form of a horse in the matter, because it is not adapted to receive the form of a horse, it therefore induces a related form. Hence in the generation of a mule the generator is similar in a way to the thing generated; for there is a proximate genus, which lacks a name, common to horse and to ass; and mule is also contained under that genus. Hence in reference to that genus it can be said that like generates like; for example, if we might say that that proximate genus is beast of burden, we could say that, even though a horse does not generate a horse but a mule, still a beast of burden generates a beast of burden.70 A mule is the offspring of a male donkey (jack) and a female horse (mare). Horses and donkeys are different species, with different numbers of chromosomes. 71 They are two species belonging to the same genus that is proximate genus. Mules and hinnies have 63 chromosomes, a mixture of the horse's 64 and the donkey's 62 (calculating, we see that A mule gets 32 horse chromosomes from mom and 31 donkey chromosomes from dad for a total of 63 chromosomes. (A horse has 64 chromosomes and a donkey has 62). Biologically speaking, the chromosomes of the donkey and the horse, allows for the generation of the mule, but the variation in chromosome number makes the mule sterile (meaning that mating happened with agents having different number of chromosomes). The number of chromosomes separate these species, this was not known to the era of Aquinas, but he acknowledges the fact that both are not of the same species, they are rather of the proximate genus. This occurrence is yet found between a tiger and a lion, what specialists refer to as liger. Proximate genus refers to a group of existents that share and have more biological similarities and affiliations than others in the group. For instance, between the man, the ape, the tiger, the lion, the whale, the dolphin, there is the genus called animal. But within this genus, man and ape share a proximate genus, the tiger and the lion share a proximate genus and so does the whale and dolphin. When animals within the same proximate genus mate, they engender what Aquinas aptly called a mean species. However, because this mean species is not generated from the other mean species, but from animals within the same proximate genus, they lack the propensity to engender further species of its kind, that is to say that such mean species are always sterile or infertile. The idea of a proximate genus is nature’s activity of building bridges amongst species.
Conclusively speaking,
a. Generation is motion to form (De Principiis Naturae, I), Creation represents an accomplished fact (De Potentia III, 3) it is not made by movement (ST, I, 45, 3).
b. What is created is being, and this is made from nothing, but what is generated is a type of being, and this is made from the privation of that being, educed from matter (De Potentia III, 8), for example, “the generation of a man is from the "not-being" which is "not-man,"” (ST I, 45, 1).
c. There are three requirements for generation, namely: matter, privation and form (De Principiis Naturae, I). In creation, the only needed requirement is the Creator.
d. What is created is being, what is generated is the composite (De Potentia III, 8), and the generator is a composite, “since the thing made must needs be like its maker” (De Potentia III, 8).
Thus, it should be noted that ALL BEING IS PRODUCED AT CREATION; GENERATION IS THE PRODUCTION OF THIS OR THAT BEING; GENERATION IS NOT CREATION.
Cited works
1 H. Diels - W. Kranz, eds., Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 59b17, Weidmann Publishers, Berlin, 1974.
2 De Potentia VIII.
3 Ibid.
4 K. Talip, Aristotle and Avicenna (Ibn Sina) In Terms Of The Theory Of Intellects, In U.Ü. Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi Yıl 7, Sayı 10, 2006/1, pp15-27.
5 Commentary on Metaphysics VII, 7.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid
Locality of the article: The article titled, Utrum creation operi naturae admisceatur, is elaborated in the De Potentia III, 8. References to this are noted in the Summa Theologia I, 14, 8; I, 45, 8; I, 79, 2-5; De Anima III, 5, 10, Commentary on Metaphysics, 6, 7, 8. De Principiis Naturae I. The reason behind the problem as contained in the Article: In this part, Aquinas confronts the issue of creation from nature, that is to say, generation. He confronts this issue, based on his conviction of the inherent misunderstanding or ignorance as to the nature of Matter and Form. He outlines particular individuals whose misconception of the term Matter and Form, have created a plethora of erroneous doctrines concerning generation. They include Anaxagoras, Plato and Avicenna. Anaxagoras, owing to the cosmological belief of his day notes that that which is created must have already been in actual existence. This thought of Anaxagoras was prevalent amongst the Eleatics. This according to Aquinas, led to the belief that nothing is made except in the sense that it is drawn out of another, wherein it was latent. Parmenides argued ruling out coming to be and passing away. The implication of this being that “what is”, for Parmenides is without start or stop. According to Anaxagoras, things do not come and pass away, but are mixed together and disassociated from the things that are.1 In the same line of thought as Empedocles, Anaxagoras accepted the impossibility that one thing changes into another, which was advocated by the Eleatic philosophy and yet Anaxagoras attempted to explain the empirical phenomena of change by mixture and separation of the universe. Anaxagoras maintained that there was neither creation, generation, nor corruption of nature, but from the beginning, everything had been in everything. Namely his famous doctrine is, Everything is in everything. In Anaxagoras, there is neither potential nor actual pre-existence, there is only actual existence, for “if it pre-existed potentially it would become out of nothing, while if it pre-existed actually, it would not become at all, since what is, does not become”.2 Anaxagoras considered the universe to always have existed, but existed in its initial form as chaos. Order was brought into the universe by the Nous. The Nous, did not create anything, but only arranged all that was chaotic in the universe. Thus accounting for what Aquinas notes as “drawn out of another wherein it was latent”3 . This line of thought is adopted by Plato, but in a different mode, to this Aquinas considers an error in understanding the nature of Form. Plato ascribed the creation of the material world to the divine craftsman (the Deimurge). The word “demiurge” is a derivative of the Greek δημιουργός, dēmiourgos, meaning literally “public worker”. It was originally a common noun meaning “craftsman” or “artisan”, but gradually it came to mean “producer” and eventually “creator”. The philosophical usage and the proper noun derive from Plato’s Timaeus, written around 360 BC, in which the demiurge is presented as the creator of the universe. This is accordingly the definition of the demiurge in the Platonic (ca. 310 BC-90 BC) and Middle Platonic (ca. 90 BC-300 AD) philosophical traditions. In the various branches of the Neoplatonic school (third century onwards), the demiurge is the fashioner of the real, perceptible world, and of the Ideas, but (in most neoplatonic systems) is still not itself “the One”. The Deimurge never created any form, but only applied the forms to the material world. As seen in his theory of the divided line, that which stands as prior to the forms is the One, which is itself uncreated. From such analysis it hold firm that the Deimurge itself is a created agent, whose agency is seen in the attribution of the forms to matter (This sort of replicates the Nous doctrine Anaxagoras). A further argument is spelt out by Avicenna (Ibn-Sina). His argument arises from his conception of creation. For Ibn Sina, the first emanation from necessary Being is numerically one; it is the first intelligence. Viewed from one aspect its existence is possible in itself and from another, it is necessary through the First Being; it knows its own essence as well as the essence of the First Being. It is the spring of multiplicity, for it has three kinds of knowledge: of the First Being- God, of its own essence insofar as it is necessary (viewed from God), and of its being as possible. Thus from the first intelligence emanate three beings: the second intelligence, the first soul and the first sphere of the fixed stars. The second intelligence viewed from itself it is possible, but from the first emanation it is necessary. From it emanates another intelligence, a second heavenly sphere and its soul. The second emanation thinks of the first being, of itself as a possible being and as a necessary being viewed from the first emanation. These continue until the last or the tenth intelligence appears and with it the ninth emanations. This tenth intelligence is also called the active intelligence, which is in the lowest sphere acts in our world. It produces the first matter which is passive and formless, but which is the basis of the four elements from which all creatures are made. The tenth intelligence, as it is the producer of matter, is the dispenser of forms. It gives to each matter its proper form and it also gives each body a soul, which as a matter of fact is its form, when that body is ready to receive it. Thus the last intelligence is the cause of the existence of the human soul as well.4 An implication of this, as will be noted by Aquinas, is the belief that every human person shares one active intellect. What stands as the difference between the point made by Anaxagoras-inclined thinkers and that of Plato is that, while for the former, the composite (form and matter) substance has existed chaotically from the beginning. The Nous only comes in to create order. The latter notes that the form exists separate from the matter, and it is the divine craftsman that occasions the sensible world by taking from the Forms and merging them with Matter.
CONCEPT CLARIFICATION In this passage of the De Potentia, a major concept that needs to be clarified is generation, from this clarity its distinction from creation will also be indicated. An understanding of what generation is: According to Aquinas, in direct corroboration to the thought of Aristotle, “every process of generation is from matter”5 . Using the example of an artisan, we notice that in the making of a brazen sphere, he makes this from bronze, which is matter. Matter here is understood as the composite, for matter as a substance cannot exist without a particular form that determines it. Thus the artisan generates the brazen sphere, a new substance, from an already existing substance. The artisan produces the form accidentally and not substantially. Aquinas explains this point making reference again to the artisan, he notes that …it ought to be evident that, just as an agent does not produce the matter or subject of generation, for example, the bronze, when he generates something, so too “neither does he produce the form,” namely, the thing itself which is a sphere, except perhaps accidentally; for he makes a brazen sphere, which is a composite. And since a brazen sphere is also a sphere, he therefore accidentally produces a sphere.6 That is to say that in generation, neither the matter nor the form of that from which generation is occasioned, is made. What is generated is the composite, because “since generation pertains to the thing generated, it is evident that it is not the form that is generated but the composite”7 . Aquinas is clear on this point as he notes: Here he(Aristotle) shows that it is composite things which are generated. He says that an agent does make a sphere to be; for he makes it from bronze, which is the matter, as the principle of generation, and from sphere, which is the form and terminus of generation. For he causes “this form,” i.e., the figure of a sphere, “in this,” i.e., in the matter, in the sense that he changes this bronze into a sphere, and this is a brazen sphere, or the form of a sphere in bronze.8 Thus of things generated, we can identify 3 classes:
a. That by which something comes from: Agent, that is “that everything which comes to be, comes to be by something, and this is the agent or generator, which is the principle of generation”9 .
b. That from which something comes from: Matter, that is “everything which comes to be, comes to be from something, and by this something from which generation takes place we mean the matter and not the privation”10.
c. That which comes to be: Something (the substance), that is “every process of generation there must be something which comes to be”11. We see from the above that the focus regards generation viewed as an action to a particular nature, from without, in which the principle of motion is extrinsic to it (the principle could also be intrinsic). This is somewhat referred to as the reason for the cause of generation. Aquinas notes that The reason for… the cause of generation is either a proper cause or an accidental one. For if it is a proper cause, it is either the principle of motion intrinsic to a thing, and then it is nature, or it is extrinsic to the thing, and then it is art; for nature is a principle of motion in that in which it exists, but art does not exist in the thing produced by art but in something else.12 The reason is either extrinsic or intrinsic. He notes further: And the reason for this… is that in every generation something which was formerly potential becomes actual. Now a thing can be said to go from potency to actuality only by reason of some actual being, which is the agent by which the process of generation is brought about. Now potency pertains to. The matter from which something is generated: and actuality pertains to the thing generated.13 At this point, the marks of a profound understanding of what generation is, stands in the offing, this is because as much as the extrinsic reason of the cause of generation is implied, there is also the intrinsic. To understand at this point, we need to define generation. Generation according to Aquinas is motion to form.14 There are two kinds of generation namely:
a. Formae Substantiali Generatio Simpliciter, for instance, man begetting man
b. Formae Accidentali Generatio Secundum Quid, for instance man becoming white.15 From the above definition, what is drawn forth is that generation is “motion”. Recalling what has been stated above, we can thus assert that in Aquinas, the intrinsic reason for the cause of generation, refers to generation by nature, and not by art. Generation by nature is such that the principle of motion resides intrinsically in the thing. Thus proceeding with the nexus seemingly created by Aquinas, in which motion is indicated to be involved in generation, a brief exposé on what motion is will be required. What is motion? Aquinas defines motion as “motion is neither the potency of a thing existing in potency, nor the act of a thing in act, but it is the act of a thing in potency; where the word “act” designates its relation to a prior potency, and the words “of a thing in potency” designates its relation to a further act”16. That which is potentially moved, is not said to have motion. That which has been actually moved is linked with the term motion, in the sense that it has been moved, but that which is in the process of going from potency to act, is principally what is associated with the concept of the act of motion. What is in potency only is not yet being moved; what is already in perfect act is not being moved but has already been moved. Consequently, that is being moved which is midway between pure potency and act, which is partly in potency and partly in act.17 That being said, it is evident that for any motion whatsoever to occur, two principles must play a part, namely potency and act. This is applicable to generation. From these two principles involved in motion, three requirements are derived for the occasioning of generation, namely
a. Being in potency (matter)
b. Non-existence in act (Privation)
c. That through which something comes to be in act (form).18
These three requirements are better understood as three principles of nature. Of the three, Matter and Form are per se principles of nature, this is because in generation, these two principles remain, but privation is lost. The principle of privation is a per accidens principle, for it is one with matter. This implies that privation is transient, for matter that does not have privation is permanent matter. Privation is the principle of becoming and not existing, but the other two are both principles of becoming and existing. It is not a negation, because the latter does not determine a subject.19 Of these two per se principles, which double also as causes in nature, there are two other causes added, the efficient and the final. These latter two are extrinsic, while the first two are intrinsic. From all that has been thus gathered, it is obvious that what is generated moves from potency to act, what is generated needs an underlying subject, which is a composite, and what is generated is a composite. Separating generation from creation: According to Aquinas, creation is neither creature nor creator. It stands at the middle, indicating a relationship between both. It is a real relationship from the point of view of the creature to the Creator, but a relationship of reason from the point of view of the Creator to the created. In the first case, the creature depends on the Creator, but in the second case, there is no dependence of the Creator on the created, but a reference that is seen via the lens of the human reason, what we refer to as a respectus. Creation is production but not in the same vein as generation or mutation. This is because while the latter requires matter, that is to say a subject, for its exercise, creation does not stand in need of a subject, but is a single act that is properly referred to God. For both generation and creation, there is a genus of relation, understood via the lens of movement. As regards motion, Aquinas in the De Potentia III, 3, notes that there is a difference between the term of movement and the process of movement. He notes that both “…differ from each other, while the movement is in progress, and when the term has been reached”20. This is because “While the movement is in progress, the thing moved is receding from one term and approaching the other: which does not apply when the term has been reached…”.21 The term of movement is also referred to as the act of motion. Motion is an act, as noted by Aquinas, "That by which something previously existing in potency becomes actual is an act. But something becomes actual when it is being moved, although previously it was in potency. Therefore motion is an act.”22 Yet motion is also in the process, for “…before something is being moved it is in potency to two acts: to a perfect act which is the term of the motion and to an imperfect act which is motion itself”23. In sum, the term of movement refers to the act of motion that has been attained to, as when boiled water becomes hot. While the process of movement expresses the passage of time as the object recedes from a potency and approaches an act, as when water is being heated, in which case we say that it has some measure of heat. In generation, the motion process (that to an imperfect act) and the motion term (that to the perfect act) acts on a subject, but creation, “cannot be taken for a movement of the creature previous to its reaching the term of movement, but denotes the accomplished fact”.24 Creation thus, does not signify a movement to being, as exemplified in the agent and the patient; nor does it denote a change effected by the Creator. But it is merely a beginning of existence, and a relation to the Creator from whom the creature receives its being. Consequently, creation is really nothing but a relation of the creature to the Creator together with a beginning of existence. 25 While motion is properly an element of generation, this is not proper to creation.
CRITICAL ARGUMENT(S) Reference needs to be made to the title of the article, which is “Does God work in Nature by creating?” Which when asked differently can be, “is the work of creation still on-going constantly in nature?” Since God alone has the exclusive right of creation, does it mean that he is constantly creating in nature? Or does nature create? Quickly Aquinas points out the error in such thinking, an error that lies in making generation a realistic synonym of creation. This error is heightened further by a misconception of the nature of Matter and that of Form. Thus there is the need to understand Matter and Form, with respect to generation; but even in such attempt, an understanding of these concepts of Matter and Form with the act of generation might pave the way for further misconstrued opinions. This is because in the process of generation, that which is generated is the composite, which is neither matter alone, nor form alone. Even though the form is “is that by reason of which generation takes place”26, what is generated is the composite. Aquinas notes that the “composite has the nature [ratio] of ‘being from a principle’”.27 However, the form in its operation is that which determines albeit actualizes matter, for the “form is nature more than matter”28. As that which actualizes matter, the form is naturally prior to matter, “for a thing is said to be greater insofar as it is in act rather than insofar as it is in potency”29. That which reduces potency to act, must already be in act, “Whence form, according to which a thing is natural in act, is nature more than matter, according to which a thing is something natural in potency”30. In the De Principiis Naturae, Aquinas notes that even though the form in its operation of actualization of matter, stands naturally prior to matter, in substance and completeness, Matter, stands prior to form when viewed according to generation and time.31 This is logical because before any act, there is an initial potency. We have established that it is the form that actualizes matter, standing naturally to matter in substance and completeness. This pertains to nature which arises from generation, and this is the form. Aquinas notes: He says that although a bed does not come to be from a bed, as Antiphon said, man does come to be from man. Whence what they say is true, namely, that the form of bed is not the nature, but the wood is. For if wood should germinate, a bed would not come to be, but wood. Therefore, as this form, which does not arise through germination, is not nature but art, so the form which arises from generation is nature. But the form of a natural thing does arise through generation, for man comes to be from man. Therefore the form of a natural thing is nature.32 He further notes that: For the process of generation can be said to be a result either of the form or of a part of the form, or of something having the form or a part of the form; but it comes from something having the form as from a generator, and from the form or a part of the form as from something by which the generator generates; for it is not the form that generates or acts, but the thing having the form generates and acts by means of it.33
As we try to understand this that which should not be oblivious to us, is the fact that in generation, it is not the nature that is generated, but it is the composite bearing the nature that is generated. The form only subsists in the composite generated. That is to say that the form is of the composite rather than saying that the form is the composite. To recap the nature of what is generated is the form, but what is generated is the composite. This implies that the composite generated is always accompanied by it consequent nature, which is the form. How is this nature generated? According to Aquinas, everything has the natural tendency to produce its like. That which is generated is either generated properly or accidentally. In whatever is generated by something accidentally, the generator does not have to be likened to the thing generated; for example, the discovery of a treasure has no likeness in him who, when he digs in order to plant something, discovers the treasure accidentally. But a generator in the proper sense generates something of the same kind as itself. Hence in a proper generator the likeness of the thing generated must exist in some way.34 To the proper generator aspect of generation, this comes about in three ways:
a. Univocally, eg, man begets man, horse begets horse; when the form of the thing generated pre-exists in the generator according to the same mode of being, and in a similar matter.
b. Partly univocally and partly equivocally, eg house as preexisting as a form in the subject (equivocally) and having its own form (univocally); when the form of the thing generated pre-exists in the generator, neither according to the same mode of being, nor in a substance of the same kind.
c. Non-univocally, eg the medicine which has been heated there pre-exists the heat which is a part of health; when the whole form of the thing generated does not preexist in the generator, but only some part of it or a part of a part.35 In generation, there is a pre-existence of the nature generated in the generator, who is the agent, for “a thing is generated by something like itself”36. Then how is the Form of the generator one with the generated? Aquinas notes that this can be realized
a. Totally: as the form of a house is in the mind of the master builder, and the form of the fire which is generated is in the fire which generates it.
b. Partly: as when a hot medicine restores health by heating; for the heat produced in the one who is being healed is a part of health.
c. Virtually (in virtue of) but partly: as when motion restores health by heating; for heat is present in the motion virtually but not actually.
d. Totally virtually (in virtue of): as when the form of numbness is in the eel which makes the hand numb.37
In what has been outlined above, a point to recall is that between the three ways in which generation occurs and the four ways in which the form of the generator is found in the generated, both the natural and artificial aspects of generation are included. Types of Generation: According to Aquinas, generation can be natural or artificial. In the aspect of the artificial generation, it can either be by art or by chance. Nonetheless, whether the generation seem to happen naturally or artificially, in proper generation, the form of that which is generated pre-exists in the generator. Considering the generation of a house by a builder, that which is built pre-exists in him, not in the materials of building. To capture this Aquinas notes: …those things which are constituted by nature are similar to those which come to be by art; for the seed acts for the purpose of generating, and this is what happens in the case of things which come to be by art; for just as a master builder is not a house actually and does not possess the form which constitutes a house actually but only potentially, so too the seed is not an animal actually, nor does it possess a soul actually, which is the form of an animal, but only potentially. For in the seed there is a formative power which is related to the matter of the thing conceived in the same way in which the form of the house in the mind of the builder is related to the stones and timbers; but there is this difference: the form of an art is wholly extrinsic to the stones and timbers, whereas the power of the seed is present in the seed itself.38 On the artificial generation, arising from chance, the occurrence of those things that arise from decay are proposed. To explain how the form is generated in these things, Aquinas makes use of the totally virtual form of generator to generated. He states that …in the matter of those things which are generated from decay there also exists a principle which is similar to the active power in the seed, by which the soul of such animals is caused. And just as the power in the seed comes from the complete soul of the animal and from the power of a celestial body, in a similar fashion the power of generating an animal which exists in decayed matter is from a celestial body alone, in which all forms of things which are generated are present virtually as in their active principle.39 In response to Ibn-Sina: the fact of Ibn-Sina’s misconception of generation with creation, which Aquinas states as follows, “Avicenna held this to be the lowest intelligence among separate substances”40, leads to the mistake of ascribing one active intelligence to all existents. He elaborated further that the agent intellect was the last in the series of incorporeal intelligences, a spiritual substance that ruled the sublunar world and illuminated the human intellect by intelligible forms. Avicenna’s view was also that the agent intellect was an entity separated from the human soul. For Avicenna the agent intellect was the active intellect of mankind, the source of abstract concepts and first principles of thought, which are received by the intellect, which is the part of human soul. This necessitated the mistake of considering the soul not as a single unit with an active and passive power whose operation are in silk-flowing sync that a difference is hardly ever noticed, but as a unit with only a passive power, gifted with an active power at the production of a new thing. The passive was individuated in every single human person, but the agent intellect was the same. This further means that at production of a substantial thing, there was the infusion of the agent intellect on that which was produced, which is tantamount to a creative work. A better understanding of the agent and potential intellect: According to Aquinas, I say with Avicenna… that the possible intellect indeed begins to exist with the body, but it does not cease with the body, and it is diverse in diverse men, and is multiplied according to the division of matter in diverse individuals, just like other substantial forms; I further add that the agent intellect is diverse in diverse men, for it does not seem probable that the rational soul lacks the principle whereby it can bring about its natural operation, but that is what would follow if one agent intellect is posited, whether it is called God or an intelligence.41 According to Aquinas there are four qualities of that are found in the human soul’s power of agent intellection, first, its separation from matter; second, its impassibility; third, its purity, by which he means that it is neither made up of bodily natures nor conjoined with a bodily organ.42 These qualities of the agent intellect are also possessed by the potential intellect. But the fourth is in where the difference is found, namely the agent intellect is essentially always in act, while the potential intellect is essentially potential and comes to act only by receiving an intelligible object.43 The human soul’s intellectual power is potential. To explain this, Aquinas makes reference the fact of the human intellect’s stance with regards to universal being. He notes, The intellect… has an operation extending to universal being. We may therefore see whether the intellect be in act or potentiality by observing first of all the nature of the relation of the intellect to universal being. For we find an intellect whose relation to universal being is that of the act of all being: and such is the Divine intellect, which is the Essence of God, in which originally and virtually, all being pre-exists as in its first cause. And therefore the Divine intellect is not in potentiality, but is pure act. But no created intellect can be an act in relation to the whole universal being; otherwise it would needs be an infinite being. Wherefore every created intellect is not the act of all things intelligible, by reason of its very existence; but is compared to these intelligible things as a potentiality to act.44 He continues further …the human intellect, which is the lowest in the order of intelligence and most remote from the perfection of the Divine intellect, is in potentiality with regard to things intelligible, and is at first "like a clean tablet on which nothing is written," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4). This is made clear from the fact, that at first we are only in potentiality to understand, and afterwards we are made to understand actually. And so it is evident that with us to understand is "in a way to be passive"; taking passion in the third sense. And consequently the intellect is a passive power.45 Yet there is also need for the power of the agent intellect to be located in the same wise in the human soul as the potential intellect is. Aquinas notes I answer that, The truth about this question depends on what we have already said (Article 4). For if the active intellect were not something belonging to the soul, but were some separate substance, there would be one active intellect for all men. And this is what they mean who hold that there is one active intellect for all. But if the active intellect is something belonging to the soul, as one of its powers, we are bound to say that there are as many active intellects as there are souls, which are multiplied according to the number of men…46 On the situation of the agent intellect in the soul, with it being differentiated and individuated in each human person, Aquinas notes: I answer that, The active intellect, of which the Philosopher speaks, is something in the soul. In order to make this evident, we must observe that above the intellectual soul of man we must needs suppose a superior intellect, from which the soul acquires the power of understanding. For what is such by participation, and what is mobile, and what is imperfect always requires the pre-existence of something essentially such, immovable and perfect. Now the human soul is called intellectual by reason of a participation in intellectual power; a sign of which is that it is not wholly intellectual but only in part. Moreover it reaches to the understanding of truth by arguing, with a certain amount of reasoning and movement. Again it has an imperfect understanding; both because it does not understand everything, and because, in those things which it does understand, it passes from potentiality to act. Therefore there must needs be some higher intellect, by which the soul is helped to understand.47 The location of the agent intellect’s location in the human soul is based on the fresh understanding offered by Aristotle, who maintains that the intelligibility of things are, contrary to Plato, not located in a different world, but are contained in the sensible thing. Thus if the intelligible is to be found as such, thus for the intellect to grasp this, there would needs be the presence of an intellectual power that could derive this via a means of abstraction. We have earlier asserted that the intellect is passive to learning, that is to say that it does not know as the divine intellect, God, does, who knows as at once, but it undergoes a series of illuminatory phases before arriving at knowledge. Aquinas maintains that for the reduction from potentiality to act, there needs be the presence of an agent that is already in act. Thus just as the “senses as made actual by what is actually sensible… We must therefore assign on the part of the intellect some power to make things actually intelligible, by abstraction of the species from material conditions”.48 The coherent operation of these two operative intellective powers makes for a differentiation in the soul, that is to say two souls having two distinct powers, but Aquinas notes that
However, it should be understood that it is not absurd that there be two things such that each is in potency with respect to the other though not in the same sense; as fire is potentially cold, which water actually is, and water is potentially warm which fire actually is. So it is that they act and are acted upon by one another. I say that sensible things relate similarly to the intellective soul: for the sensible thing is potentially intelligible and actually has a distinct nature; in the soul there is the actual intellectual light; but the determinant of knowledge with respect to this or that nature is in potency; just as the pupil is in potency with respect to this or that colour. The soul has a power, namely agent intellect, through which it makes sensible species to be actually intelligible, and it has a power through which it is in potency such that it can be brought into the act of determinate knowledge by the species of the intelligible thing made intelligible in act; and this power is called the possible intellect.49 It is one soul, with the one intellect having two powers of intellection. In response to Plato, we have already stated that such absurdity of thought is falsified based on the fact of that the intelligible forms exists in the matter, and not in a different. This thus implies that there would not be the need of a divine craftsman to be called to action whenever a substance is about to be produced.
These responses outlined above gives emphasis to the fact of a negation to a continued work of creation in the dynamics of nature. In response to Anaxagoras: As earlier mentioned, Anaxagoras’ thought was the fruit of his time. Drawing from such big weights as Parmenides, Anaxagoras advances with the maxim that “everything is everything”. The Parmenidean thought system held that what is, is and what is not cannot be. In his poems on Nature he states: One path only is left for us to speak of, namely, that it is. In it are very many tokens that what is, is uncreated and indestructible, alone, complete, immovable and without end. Nor was it ever, nor will it be; for now it is, all at once, a continuous one. For what kind of origin for it, will you look for ? In what way and from what source could it have drawn its increase? I shall not let thee say nor think that it came from what is not; for it can neither be thought nor uttered that what is not is. And, if it came from nothing, what need could have made it arise later rather than sooner? Therefore must it either be altogether or be not at all. Nor will the force of truth suffer aught to arise besides itself from that which in any way is… how could it come into being? If it came into being, it is not; nor is it if it is going to be in the future.50 What is, then has always been and what is not remains as it is, nothing. The coming of being from nothing is referenced here as being absurdly impossible. Aquinas corrects this as he notes “It is not correct to say that the form is made in matter, rather should we say that it is educed from the potentiality of matter”.51 Can creation pertain to any other being apart from God? This question is partly raised arising from the misconception-riddled analyses of Plato and Avicenna. Aquinas in the De Potentia III, 1, notes, making reference to the De Causis, that “being (esse) is by creation…” In De Potentia III, 3, he notes that “creation is an accomplished fact”. In another place he notes, what is created, is not made by movement, or by change. For what is made by movement or by change is made from something pre-existing. And this happens, indeed, in the particular productions of some beings, but cannot happen in the production of all being by the universal cause of all beings, which is God. Hence God by creation produces things without movement. Now when movement is removed from action and passion, only relation remains…52 What is created, is being, and this is made from nothing, but what is generated is a type of being, and this is made from the privation of that being, for example, “the generation of a man is from the "notbeing" which is "not-man,"”53. In the act of creation, there is nothing which pre-exists in the thing that is created, this is the differential mark between creation and every other form of change, which presupposes some matter or subject.
How can this further be understood? In SCG II, 22, it says, “everything exists because it has esse.” In SCG II, 15, Aquinas notes that there is a proportionality of effects to causes, effects are commensurate to their causes. Thus just as effects are referred to their appropriate causes, thus that which is common to the effect must have a common cause. Esse is common to all that is. Everything participates in the esse that is the effect of the IES. The IES transcends all that is. The implication of this is that it cannot be the cause of a single existent, but is the cause of all that exists. Since there is a necessary proportionality of effect to cause, a universal cause must have a universal effect. A potential cause, produces a potential effect, an actual cause leads to an actual effect, a particular cause will produce a particular effect (ST, I, 45, 1). For the effect depends on the cause in as much as it participates in the cause (Expositio De Ebdomadibus, lect. 2, p. 271:80–83). Thus, the effect of the IES, must necessary be on a universal level. The first effect of the IES, is the esse (De Potentia III, 4). Thus, what emanates from the IES, as its first effect, is the Ipsum Esse, (and this is creation, that to say it is the level of creation), for the work of creation is in the absolute production of esse and not in the production of this or that esse. It is the esse that actuates completely the capacity of the essence and is the original fount of all the riches in the ens. This is valid for all enti. 54 The perfection of the esse has a virtuality and a force of expansion that is remarkably incomprehensible, because it pervades the entirety of all essences, while continuing “to be” as it always is the esse, or the ipsum esse or the actus essendi. Thus esse found in the enti, is realized either in more or less fashion, while conserving its proper identity. It is properly referred to as the “intensive act”.55 In corporeal substances, the essence is composed of matter and form,56 but in the SCG II, 54, 4, Aquinas notes that the form is the principle of the esse. This ought to be better explained. What is being referred to here as “the form is the principle of the esse”, can also be construed as forma dat esse. 57 This forma dat esse signifies two things which is: a. That the form gives to the composite the formale actuality b. That the form gives to the composite the l’atto di essere. 58 This implies that the l’esse ut actus is the principle in the transcendental order suited for the original constitution of the ens, and the form is the principle in the predicamental order for the determination of the grade of perfection59 in the ens. Thus the form is not the principle of the l’esse ut actus, but is the principle of the l’esse in actu, what Aquinas refers to as “having its own esse” (ST I, 45, 4). The form as the principle of esse means that (according to SCG II, 54, 6) the form can be called that by which a thing is. The form, however, is not the thing, for even though the form is “that by reason of which generation takes place (De Principiis Naturae, II), that which is generated is the composite. In the De Substantis Separatis, he notes that a composite being, considered in its essence, already has a form but it participates in the l’esse through its form. 60 He notes further that First Principle produces the first effect immediately and through the mediation of the first effect, He brings things into being in a certain order. By way of change and motion, certain effects can be brought into being by the First Principle through the mediation of second causes; but according to that mode of production which takes place without motion, called creation, an effect is reduced to God alone as its Author.61 The esse is the effect of the Ipsum Esse Subsistens, as earlier noted. In the SCG, Aquinas notes: Moreover, to act only by motion and change is incompatible with the universal cause of being; for, by motion and change a being is not made from absolute non-being, but this being from this non-being. Yet, as was shown, God is the universal principle of being. Therefore, to act only by motion or by change is contrary to His nature. Neither, then, is it proper to Him to need pre-existing matter in order to make something.62 The point emphasized here is that in generation, the principle of privation which is one and the same time conjoined to matter is active, but in Creation, this is absent. In Creation is there is the presence of nothing, total negation, a negation that is non-determining. Whereas in privation, there is determination, “for privation is not negation”63. Generation arises from non-existence, but creation arises from nothing.
RENOWNED OBJECTIONS The objections to this part of the De Potentia are twenty (20) in number, and the Aquinas gives short replies, based on the fact that the corpus of the work carries the full explanation of all that is being objected upon. Nonetheless there are three major objections that stand out, three objections that Aquinas does not fully elaborate in the De Potentia, but does so in his Commentary on the Metaphysics. The objections thus that would be considered includes objections 1, 15 and 16.
Objection 1: in this objection, the biblical quotation of 1Corinthians 3:6, neither suggests that the there is an ongoing work of creation in the order of nature not does it state that God has bestowed to the dynamics of nature, the act of creation. It emphasizes the point that has just been lately unveiled, which is that in the acts of nature, the work of creation is seen in the activity of generation. That is to say that the activity of generation was at one and the same time instilled at creation. According to Aquinas in ST I, 90, 4, God alone can create, for the first agent alone can act without presupposing the existence of anything, while the second cause always presupposes something derived from the first cause… everything acts by producing a change (that is generation), whereas God alone acts by creation. In the De Potentia III, 7, he states: God is his own power, and that he is in all things not as part of their essence, but as upholding them in their being, we shall conclude that he acts in every agent immediately without prejudice to the action of the will and of nature.64 Nature does act, having in itself the power of generation, a power that has been instilled upon it by the Creator at creation. God’s work in nature is immediate by the fact that God upholds all that is in nature in being, for “He gives everything the power to act, and preserves it in being…”65 Although nature generates, God is the cause of all that is generated. Aquinas lists out four arguments still in the De Potentia III, 7, which will be briefly stated here to majorly emphasize the notion that the instantaneous creative act of God (the creative work of God as an accomplished fact, De Potentia III, 3) is to be differentiated from the daily process of generation in nature. Further more, it will show how God’s instantaneous creative act (as an accomplished fact), has made possible the act of generation in nature, for God is the first cause of all that is. Briefly the four arguments are about how one thing causes another to act, they include:
a. God causes all the actions of nature, because he gave natural things the forces whereby they are able to act, not only as the generator gives power to heavy and light bodies yet does not preserve it, but also as upholding its very being, forasmuch as he is the cause of the power bestowed, not only like the generator in its becoming, but also in its being; and thus God may be said to be the cause of an action by both causing and upholding the natural power in its being.
b. God preserves and sustains the power of action in nature, as it upholds it in being.
c. God causes the act of nature by moving it to act.
d. One thing causes the action of another, as a principal agent causes the action of its instrument: and in this way again, God causes every action of natural things.66
Objection 15: this concerns the generation of animals from decay or from putrid matter and not from seed as seen in the natural generation. We had earlier affirmed that Aquinas considers generation to be either natural or artificial, and in the artificial aspect, it is either by art or by chance. The generation of animals from putrid matter, does not give credence to the belief in the ongoing work of creation, but indicates the intended action of a proper agent or an accidental act. In his Commentary on the Metaphysics, he states: …animals which are generated without seed from decay do not seem to be produced by chance but by some definite agent, namely, by the power of the heavens, which supplies in the generation of such animals the energy of the generative power found in the seed.67 He goes on to assert: …it must be noted that nothing prevents a process of generation from being a proper process when referred to one cause, and yet be an accidental or chance affair when referred to another cause, as is evident in the Philosopher’s example. For when health results from a vigorous rubbing quite apart from the aim of the one doing the rubbing, the process of restoring health, if it is referred to nature, which governs the body, is not accidentally but properly aimed at. However, if it is referred to the aim of the one doing the rubbing, it will be accidental and a matter of chance. Similarly, if the process of generation of an animal generated from decay is referred to the particular causes acting here below, it will also be found to be accidental and a matter of chance; for heat, which causes decay, is not inclined by nature to have as its goal the generation of this or that particular animal which results from decay, as the power in the seed has as its goal the generation of something of a particular type. But if it is referred to the power of the heavens, which is the universal power regulating generation and corruption in these lower bodies, it is not accidental but is directly aimed at, because its goal is that all forms existing potentially in matter should be brought to actuality. Thus Aristotle has correctly compared here the things which come to be by art with those which come to be by nature. 68 The same biological processes that act on the seed, in the natural generation (by virtue of the act of the power of the heavens), also acts as the proper agent of those animals that are generated from decay, when considered from the part of the agent. But when considered from the part of those generated, then the act is accidentally wrought by chance. However, the same powers that are at work when life is generated from seed, is also at work when life is generated without seed, but from decaying matter.
Objection 16: Aquinas subscribes to the fact that nature has the tendency to produce its like, that is to say that a man cannot beget a dog, and a dog cannot beget a cat. But the rigidity of this ethos of nature is circumvented in the case of horses and mules. If this objection holds, then it might be that nature does create. But Aquinas responds to this by calling upon the term, “Proximate Genus”. He states, He shows that separate Forms cannot be the cause of the generation of things after the manner of an exemplar. He says that even though in some cases one may encounter the problem whether the generator is similar to the thing generated, still in the case of some things it is evident that the generator is of the same kind as the thing generated: not numerically the same but specifically, as is clear in the case of natural beings; for man begets man, and similarly a horse begets a horse, and each natural thing produces something similar to itself in species, unless something beyond nature happens to result, as when a horse begets a mule. And this generation is beyond nature, because it is outside of the aim of a particular nature. 69 He continues: …the formative power, which is in the sperm of the male, is designed by nature to produce something completely the same as that from which the sperm has been separated; but its secondary aim, when it cannot induce a perfect likeness, is to induce any kind of likeness that it can. And since in the generation of a mule the sperm of a horse cannot induce the form of a horse in the matter, because it is not adapted to receive the form of a horse, it therefore induces a related form. Hence in the generation of a mule the generator is similar in a way to the thing generated; for there is a proximate genus, which lacks a name, common to horse and to ass; and mule is also contained under that genus. Hence in reference to that genus it can be said that like generates like; for example, if we might say that that proximate genus is beast of burden, we could say that, even though a horse does not generate a horse but a mule, still a beast of burden generates a beast of burden.70 A mule is the offspring of a male donkey (jack) and a female horse (mare). Horses and donkeys are different species, with different numbers of chromosomes. 71 They are two species belonging to the same genus that is proximate genus. Mules and hinnies have 63 chromosomes, a mixture of the horse's 64 and the donkey's 62 (calculating, we see that A mule gets 32 horse chromosomes from mom and 31 donkey chromosomes from dad for a total of 63 chromosomes. (A horse has 64 chromosomes and a donkey has 62). Biologically speaking, the chromosomes of the donkey and the horse, allows for the generation of the mule, but the variation in chromosome number makes the mule sterile (meaning that mating happened with agents having different number of chromosomes). The number of chromosomes separate these species, this was not known to the era of Aquinas, but he acknowledges the fact that both are not of the same species, they are rather of the proximate genus. This occurrence is yet found between a tiger and a lion, what specialists refer to as liger. Proximate genus refers to a group of existents that share and have more biological similarities and affiliations than others in the group. For instance, between the man, the ape, the tiger, the lion, the whale, the dolphin, there is the genus called animal. But within this genus, man and ape share a proximate genus, the tiger and the lion share a proximate genus and so does the whale and dolphin. When animals within the same proximate genus mate, they engender what Aquinas aptly called a mean species. However, because this mean species is not generated from the other mean species, but from animals within the same proximate genus, they lack the propensity to engender further species of its kind, that is to say that such mean species are always sterile or infertile. The idea of a proximate genus is nature’s activity of building bridges amongst species.
Conclusively speaking,
a. Generation is motion to form (De Principiis Naturae, I), Creation represents an accomplished fact (De Potentia III, 3) it is not made by movement (ST, I, 45, 3).
b. What is created is being, and this is made from nothing, but what is generated is a type of being, and this is made from the privation of that being, educed from matter (De Potentia III, 8), for example, “the generation of a man is from the "not-being" which is "not-man,"” (ST I, 45, 1).
c. There are three requirements for generation, namely: matter, privation and form (De Principiis Naturae, I). In creation, the only needed requirement is the Creator.
d. What is created is being, what is generated is the composite (De Potentia III, 8), and the generator is a composite, “since the thing made must needs be like its maker” (De Potentia III, 8).
Thus, it should be noted that ALL BEING IS PRODUCED AT CREATION; GENERATION IS THE PRODUCTION OF THIS OR THAT BEING; GENERATION IS NOT CREATION.
Cited works
1 H. Diels - W. Kranz, eds., Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 59b17, Weidmann Publishers, Berlin, 1974.
2 De Potentia VIII.
3 Ibid.
4 K. Talip, Aristotle and Avicenna (Ibn Sina) In Terms Of The Theory Of Intellects, In U.Ü. Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi Yıl 7, Sayı 10, 2006/1, pp15-27.
5 Commentary on Metaphysics VII, 7.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid
11 Ibid.
12 Commentary on Metaphysics VII, 6.
13 Ibid.
14 De Principiis Naturae I.
15 Ibid. That is substantial and accidental generation. Apparently, from this point, it should be noted that corruption is evidently the opposite of generation.
16 Commentary on Physics III, 2.
17 Ibid.
18 De Principiis Naturae I.
19 Ibid.
20 De Potentia III, 3.
21 Ibid.
22 Commentary on Physics III, 2.
23 Ibid. Aquinas uses the example of the heating of water as he notes, «Thus water, before it begins to be heated, is in potency to being heated and to having been heated: when it is being heated it is being reduced to the imperfect act which is motion but not yet to perfect act which is the term of the motion». (Commentary on Physics, III, 2.)
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
12 Commentary on Metaphysics VII, 6.
13 Ibid.
14 De Principiis Naturae I.
15 Ibid. That is substantial and accidental generation. Apparently, from this point, it should be noted that corruption is evidently the opposite of generation.
16 Commentary on Physics III, 2.
17 Ibid.
18 De Principiis Naturae I.
19 Ibid.
20 De Potentia III, 3.
21 Ibid.
22 Commentary on Physics III, 2.
23 Ibid. Aquinas uses the example of the heating of water as he notes, «Thus water, before it begins to be heated, is in potency to being heated and to having been heated: when it is being heated it is being reduced to the imperfect act which is motion but not yet to perfect act which is the term of the motion». (Commentary on Physics, III, 2.)
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 De Principiis Naturae II.
27 Commentary on Physics II, 2
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 De Principiis Naturae IV.
32 Commentary on Physics II, 2.
33 Commentary on Metaphysics VII, 8.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid. The action of the celestial body on the seed of the animal is explained by the fact of the basic biologically favourable conditions that entertain the survival of the seed, leading to the generation of that which is generated. This is seen in the case of those things that are generated from decay. The same biological conditions that are called upon for the sake of the seed also comes to play in this case.
40 De Potentia III, 8.
41 The Sentences II, 2, I.
42 De Anima III, 5, X.
43 Ibid. 44 ST I, 79, II
45 Ibid.
46 ST I, 79, V.
47 ST I, 79, IV.
48 ST I, 79, III.
49 The Sentences II, 2, I.
50 Poem of Parmenides. On Nature, VIII.
51 De Potentia III, 8.
52 ST I, 45, 3
53 ST I, 45, 1
54 C. Ferraro, Appunti Di Metafisica, Lateran University Press, Rome, 2013, 180.
55 Ibid.
42 De Anima III, 5, X.
43 Ibid. 44 ST I, 79, II
45 Ibid.
46 ST I, 79, V.
47 ST I, 79, IV.
48 ST I, 79, III.
49 The Sentences II, 2, I.
50 Poem of Parmenides. On Nature, VIII.
51 De Potentia III, 8.
52 ST I, 45, 3
53 ST I, 45, 1
54 C. Ferraro, Appunti Di Metafisica, Lateran University Press, Rome, 2013, 180.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid, 125.
57 Ibid, 206.
58 Ibid, 207.
59 Ibid.
60 De Substantis Separatis III, 8
61 De Substantis Separatis III, 10
62 SCG II, 16.
63 De Principiis Naturae, I.
64 De Potentia III, 7
65 Ibid.
64 De Potentia III, 7
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Commentary on Metaphysics VII, 6.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid, VII, 7.
70 Ibid. 71 Of the two F1 hybrids (first generation hybrids) between these two species, a mule is easier to obtain than a hinny, which is the offspring of a female donkey (jenny) and a male horse (stallion).
67 Commentary on Metaphysics VII, 6.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid, VII, 7.
70 Ibid. 71 Of the two F1 hybrids (first generation hybrids) between these two species, a mule is easier to obtain than a hinny, which is the offspring of a female donkey (jenny) and a male horse (stallion).
